tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-63379092376111827302024-03-21T08:26:04.961-07:00INSIDE MAGHREBA dissector of political and media narrative in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania. The Blog seeks to provide counter-perspectives on state-mediated political, social and cultural discourse in Maghreb states.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.comBlogger45125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-42960708463719955492015-09-05T02:43:00.000-07:002017-07-25T11:46:36.460-07:00Political Quake in Morocco<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhhyphenhyphenPwMTArEAhN-9CTjNQovBXxSEMFj4DtwcG_V1PYGcnbEX3Rhsz9Ql7YQQVIhdWc4mEqk562IBtoMH1fecTy81u0pul-x8IBu3SjhZ9afM7KLFQody74CcqjDFHw-9Bzlhg1ZQfVwEQU/s1600/pic.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="113" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhhyphenhyphenPwMTArEAhN-9CTjNQovBXxSEMFj4DtwcG_V1PYGcnbEX3Rhsz9Ql7YQQVIhdWc4mEqk562IBtoMH1fecTy81u0pul-x8IBu3SjhZ9afM7KLFQody74CcqjDFHw-9Bzlhg1ZQfVwEQU/s200/pic.jpg" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><strong>Mustapha Ajbaili</strong><br />
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Morocco’s Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) prevailed in local elections <span class="aBn" data-term="goog_160915210" style="border-bottom-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-bottom-style: dashed; border-bottom-width: 1px; position: relative; top: -2px; z-index: 0;" tabindex="0"><span class="aQJ" style="position: relative; top: 2px; z-index: -1;">on Friday</span></span>, scoring landslide victories in the country’s major cities of Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, Marrakech, Fes and Agadir. In a major development, the Islamist party dislodged the opposition leader Hamid Chabat from his stronghold of Fes, which has been the political power base of the Istiqlal Party since independence and the hometown of Morocco’s aristocratic leadership for decades. Now it has fallen whole-heartedly to Islamists.</div>
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In Rabat the Islamist party also routed the Socialist Union and its iconic strategist and prominent economist Fathallah Oualalou, <b>whose socialist activism propelled him to operate as the engine of Morocco’s privatization program,</b> what an irony this is!!! </div>
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In Casablanca, the PJD captured most seats and is now set to manage the economic hub of the kingdom unchallenged!</div>
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In Marrakech, the tourist hub with a vibrant night life, the Islamist party ousted the the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), which was formed in 2008 and quickly shot to power nationwide in 2009. PAM is the most controversial party in the country. PJD leader Benkirane refers to it as a “gang” of suspected big money launders and drug dealer and bankers!</div>
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In Agadir, the southern tourist
magnet, and the hometown of this author, the PJD overthrew the socialist Union
which ruled the city for 34 years<o:p></o:p></div>
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This is a major development in
Morocco’s democratic experiment. Now the question is: what does it mean that the
Islamist party has won?<o:p></o:p></div>
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This will be the subject of my
following blog post later today. Stay tuned. </div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-70413184878144778762012-06-19T00:11:00.003-07:002012-06-19T00:11:18.609-07:00Egypt Brotherhood’s presidential victory claim seen as preemptive maneuver<div class="main_body">
By <span style="color: red;">Mustapha Ajbaili</span> <br />
<br />
Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential candidate Mohammed Mursi’s
surprise dawn media appearance in which he claimed victory in Egypt’s
first free election was seen as a “preemptive maneuver” to thwart
possible vote rigging by the election commission backed by the ruling
generals.<br />
<br />
The vast and well-organized network of the Muslim Brotherhood began
releasing instant results of the vote count shortly after the polling
stations closed at 10 p.m. on Sunday. The results showed Mursi advancing
in most of the provinces.<br />
<div class="paragTitle">
</div>
<div class="contentParagraph">
<div class="with-margin">
His rival and former air force
commander Ahmad Shafiq was shown to be leading in few but sizable areas,
including the Sharqia province, which is home to both candidates. <br />
<br />
About six hours into the vote count, Mursi’s campaign, which had
delegates in all the 13,000 plus polling centers across Egypt, compiled
results and announced its victory in a press conference at dawn. <br />
<br />
After a campaign spokesman said Mursi had secured 52.5 percent of the
votes, against 47.5 of Shafiq, the Brotherhood candidate surprisingly
appeared to make the announcement himself. <br />
<br />
Surrounded by senior Brotherhood members, including the president of the
dissolved People’s Assembly, Mursi promised to be the president of all
Egyptians and offered a message of “peace.” <br />
<br />
“Hand-in-hand with all Egyptians for a better future, freedom,
democracy, development and peace,” Mursi said, without clearly stating
that he had won the election, apparently leaving it for the electoral
commission to formally announce.<br />
<br />
“We are not seeking vengeance or to settle accounts,” he said, adding
that he would build a “modern, democratic state” for all Egyptian
citizens, Muslims and Christians.<br />
<br />
Veteran Egyptian journalist Ahmed Abdallah, said Mursi’s “prompt
declaration of victory was a smart move against any possible attempt to
rig the results in favor of Shafiq. <br />
<br />
“Because everything is possible in Egyptian politics, the Brotherhood
moved quickly to claim victory and present results from their widely
effective network of delegates across the nation,” he said. <br />
<br />
“If they had waited until the morning, the results could have been different,” Abdallah said.<br />
<br />
In the same vein, deputy editor-in-chief of AlArabiya.net, Farrag
Ismail, said the Brotherhood’s quick move to declare victory was “a
precautionary measure for fear of fraud.”<br />
<br />
In the first round of the elections, Brotherhood held a press conference
every hour to announce the latest results “with the January 25
television channel covering the press conferences as a testimony,” he
said.<br />
<br />
“The Brotherhood’s announcement early this morning was seen by some as a
precipitous declaration, but they did it because they did not trust the
high electoral commission which oversees the elections and they did not
trust the military council, believed to favor Shafiq.”<br />
<br />
Supporters of Mursi flocked to Cairo’s iconic Tahrir Square on Monday
morning to celebrate their candidate’s self-proclaimed victory. <br />
<br />
Any different result in favor of Shafiq, if announced by the election
commission this week, would likely anger Mursi’s supporters already
celebrating in the streets and would plunge the country deeper in
turmoil.<br />
<br />
Spokesman for Shafiq’s campaign, Ahmed Sarhan, told the media this
morning that the Brotherhood’s declaration was designed to establish a
de facto situation to discredit any possible different results that
could be announced later by the independent election commission.</div>
<div class="with-margin">
<br /></div>
<div class="with-margin">
(Published on English.AlArabiya.net Monday June 18, 2012) </div>
</div>
</div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-52788880282332782292012-06-14T22:03:00.004-07:002012-06-14T22:10:26.042-07:00Egyptians are as polarized today as they were under Mubarak<div class="main_body">
<span style="color: red;">By Mustapha Ajbaili </span><br />
<br />
Torn between the choice of a former air force commander who
promised to restore stability with an iron fist and an Islamist who
pledged to implement “God’s law” if elected president, many secularists
in Egypt turn to Tahrir Square to seek refuge from an excruciating
reality. <br />
<br />
Following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak last year, liberal democrats
shifted the focus of their ire to the generals who took over power.
However, the refusal by the Muslim Brotherhood to join the protests for
an immediate end to military rule essentially aborted the “second
revolution.”<br />
<br />
<div class="paragTitle">
</div>
<div class="contentParagraph">
<div class="with-margin">
Observers in both the West and
the Arab world should have understood then that the Islamist movement
is the key to any major change in the country. Mainstream Arab and
Western media portrayed the conflict in post-revolutionary Egypt as one
between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the liberal
revolutionaries. <br />
<br />
Reality indicates that this is a major conflict but not a defining one.<br />
<br />
Recent results from the presidential elections coupled with the verdict
in former president Hosni Mubarak’s trial reveal that a decades-old
fight between the Brotherhood and the former regime is far from over and
that it continues to dominate and shape the country’s political scene. <br />
<br />
Egyptians are as polarized today as they were during Mubarak’s
decades-old rule. The old regime, with its links to the military, has
served the interests of many people who continue to support it. The
Brotherhood relies on a wide base of staunch supporters and members
linked in a web of complicated shared interests as well.<br />
<br />
The liberals who dream of a Western-style democracy find themselves on
the periphery with the painful reality of having to choose between
Mohammed Mursi and Ahmed Shafiq or boycott the elections.<br />
<br />
George Friedman, of Stratfor Global Intelligence, recently wrote that
Westerners misunderstood the popular movement demanding an end to the
military rule as one that was “driven by the spirit of Western
liberalism.”<br />
<br />
“The result is that we have a showdown not between the liberal
democratic mass and a crumbling military regime but between a
representative of the still-powerful regime (Shafiq) and the Muslim
Brotherhood.”</div>
<div class="with-margin">
<br /></div>
<div class="with-margin">
(Published on English.alarabiya.net on June 11, 2012) </div>
</div>
</div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-40856184585831429912012-06-02T02:44:00.003-07:002012-06-02T02:44:22.346-07:00Egypt’s ‘trial of the century’ a warning for revolutionary forces<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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By <span style="color: red;">Mustapha Ajbaili</span></div>
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Following today’s ruling that sent Hosni Mubarak and his
interior minster, Hababi al-Adly, to prison for life and the acquittal of
Mubarak’s two sons’ Alaa and Gamal and other senior members of the Central
Security (SS), revolutionary powers were dealt another blow and it is time they
put their differences aside and re-collect themselves in a powerful mass to
push back against the old regime that is now forcefully returning to Egypt. </div>
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The ruling military in Egypt has succeeded in driving a
wedge between revolutionary forces as it drove the battle from the streets of
Cairo to a legal maze and a network of constitutional paths and hedges.</div>
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</div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-63323414250216671372012-05-29T07:05:00.003-07:002012-05-29T07:17:14.856-07:00Legal immunity for Morocco’s armed forces rings alarm bells<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-s7ldDhArBA4/T8TZ2jcePrI/AAAAAAAAAOc/1HK9BdTg3R4/s1600/Morocco1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" rba="true" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-s7ldDhArBA4/T8TZ2jcePrI/AAAAAAAAAOc/1HK9BdTg3R4/s320/Morocco1.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
(Photo courtesy of Hespress) <br />
<strong>By <span style="color: red;">Mustapha Ajbaili</span></strong><br />
<br />
A Moroccan draft law that seeks to grant members of the armed forces legal immunity for “military operations” carried out inside the kingdom has sparked criticism by human rights organizations who say it violates the principle of equal justice under law.<br />
<br />
The “basic guarantees for the military” draft law states that “criminal investigation shall not be applied to members of the Royal Armed Forces who are executing the orders of their commanders…during an operation inside the national territories.”<br />
The proposed legislation also states that military members will be “entitled to state protection … against threats, prosecution, or abuse during or after their duty.” <br />
<br />
The participation of military forces in the crackdown on pro-democracy protests in some Arab Spring countries like Libya, Yemen and currently Syria, has left many people in the region increasingly suspicious about their armed forces.<br />
<br />
The Egyptian army, for instance, had noticeably sided with protesters in the early days of the country’s anti-regime uprising, but was later accused of violently cracking down on protests and of committing extra-judicial killings and imprisoning revolutionaries.<br />
<br />
A coalition of 18 human rights organizations in Morocco last week sounded alarm bells by warning that the proposed legislation would “legitimize the rules of impunity” if passed.<br />
<br />
In a joint statement, the rights groups dismissed the draft law – prepared and submitted by the minister delegate for defense in the Islamist-led government – as a “dangerous step that would jeopardize freedoms and threaten the safety and the lives of the citizens.” <br />
<br />
The Moroccan Coalition for Human Rights Groups urged the parliament not to approve the draft legislation, which it said needed “substantial amendments to conform to basic principles of human rights and the state of law.”<br />
<br />
“Issuing and executing military orders has to be in accordance with the rules of professionalism and responsibility attached to members of the armed forces in protecting civilians during states of war and peace,” the rights groups added. <br />
<br />
The groups also said that the government should not allow human rights violations to take place under the pretexts of military discipline.<br />
<br />
Families of victims who died in the Western Sahara War during 1975 -1991 also criticized the proposed legal immunity for members of the army, saying it “goes against the spirit of the new constitution and the recommendation of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission with regards to the questioning of security services and international treaties signed by Morocco.”<br />
<br />
Ibrahim Asaidi, Arab world defense policies analyst, told Al Arabiya that Article 7 of the proposed legislation “clearly” violates Morocco’s new constitution, which states that all citizens, including members of the armed forces, are equal under the law.<br />
<br />
Asaidi said the legislation is designed to protect high-ranking military officials, including powerful generals, from being questioned in high profile corruption cases nationally and internationally.<br />
<br />
In February, Morocco’s King Mohammed pledged to improve the conditions of the serving and retired military personnel following small-scale protests by veterans and a few cases of soldiers burning themselves to death.<br />
<br />
<br />
(Published on English.alarabiya.net May 28, 2012)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-24680703934929914762012-05-22T06:19:00.002-07:002012-05-22T06:22:34.242-07:00Has Morocco’s gov’t hit a brick wall in reform mission?<span style="color: red;">By Mustapha Ajbaili</span><br />
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<br />
Since assuming office nearly five months ago, Morocco’s moderate Islamist-led government has worked arduously to punch a hole in an old system resistant to reform. It has failed almost at every attempt, disappointed many of those who saw in them a glimmer of hope, and created enemies with various social forces, including largely the unemployed graduates.<br />
<br />
The pessimists are gaining ground and the protest movement, once thought to be dead, rebounded last Sunday with sizeable rallies in several cities. <br />
<br />
The much publicized “participatory governance” ─ a shared decision-making process between elected officials and the royal court ─ has turned into a euphemistic expression for a post-Arab Spring form of collective totalitarianism. <br />
<br />
Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane has walked a tightrope for almost five months, trying to satisfy the public without upsetting the king and the coterie of oligarchs running the political show from behind a curtain. <br />
<br />
During the election campaign, Benkirane’s Justice and Development Party (JPD) promised to mend the state budget by fighting corruption, inequality, and privileges.<br />
Benkirane must have known well that he was up against a system set up in a way to ensure that no political party wins an outright majority and is thus unable to form a government by itself. <br />
<br />
Benkirane found himself in a coalition with one of Morocco’s most corrupt and powerful political parties, the Istiqlal (Independence) party and the populist Islamist leader will see his coalition breaking apart the moment he begins to touch sensitive nerves of corruption.<br />
<br />
We saw that recently when PJD Minister of Information Mustapha el-Khalfi came up with a proposal to reform the media sector. The proposed bill contained new audiovisual media guidelines devised to ensure the transparency, independence and competitiveness in the sector. Media hawks orbiting the establishment, best known locally as the Makhzen, hit back at the minister’s proposed plan and rejected it entirely. <br />
<br />
Why? <br />
Mediated explanations focused on the fact that the new guidelines sought to “Islamize” the Moroccan media and that the hawks were defending the values of modernity, openness and liberty.<br />
<br />
However, such values are the least of their concerns. They are more concerned about money and about losing their privileges, because the new guidelines call for the transparency of audiovisual production contracts and that they be awarded on merit, not favoritism.<br />
<br />
What happened next? <br />
<br />
The hawks appeared to have won the skirmish. The minister was summoned to the palace and all we heard later was that his proposed bill was ordered to be shelved. <br />
<br />
This is just a small example of the government’s failure to reform the system and while it is still early to make a definitive judgment about its performance, its tendency to surrender each time it provokes a fight is frustrating to the people.<br />
<br />Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-71316606403716086832012-03-27T15:05:00.001-07:002012-04-04T02:03:54.562-07:00Implicit alliance of Egypt’s Islamists and military rulers shows cracks<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-mAv8nBUK1mc/T3I5VjyRmII/AAAAAAAAAOE/aUL3DGb3_uk/s1600/Egypt.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-mAv8nBUK1mc/T3I5VjyRmII/AAAAAAAAAOE/aUL3DGb3_uk/s320/Egypt.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="color: black;">By:</span></b></span><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="color: red;"> Mustapha Ajbaili </span></b></span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">An alliance that was formed following the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak between Egypt’s powerful Muslim Brotherhood group and the intractable ruling generals has exhibited cracks in the recent weeks as the country moves closer to the presidential race. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">Both parties built up their strengths in the shade during Mubarak’s 30-year rule. The military took advantage of billions of dollars in U.S. military aid to strengthen itself far from the public limelight, while the Muslim brotherhood built up a massive underground network that brought it closer to the lives of millions of Egyptians.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">In the wake of the Jan. 25 revolution, both forces made their presence felt in the country’s political center stage. Both appeared to understand one another’s might, agenda, and the need for mutual cooperation, which developed into an alliance – however implicit this might be. The coming together of the two forces in the post-revolutionary Egypt spared the country a clash of the titans.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">Coming under fire from liberal groups last year, the military moved closer to the Brotherhood and succumbed to its “less painful” demands in several occasions to win their support. For the generals, winning the support of Egypt’s most powerful political bloc was essential for steering the boat in the direction of their intended objective, which looks more like a democracy, but not a democracy. They want a system in which elected officials manage domestic affairs but have little say on strategic matters.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">While everyone was busy talking about a “Turkish model” that reconciles Islam with democracy, the generals in Cairo appeared to be heading towards a “Turkish model” in which a "pasha" general – like the leader of Turkey’s 1980 military coup, Kenan Evren – acts as the custodian of the state’s strategic issues, especially when it comes to foreign policy, including primarily the relation with the United States and Israel.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">Muslim Brotherhood leaderships, appearing to have learned from decades of enmity with Egyptian rulers, decided this time it was in their best interest to support the military in the path to democracy, because they are all but certain to emerge as the victors.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">The two forces had interests in joint collaboration during the transitional period, but their starkly different – if not opposing – visions of the future dictated their inevitable breakup – and the cracks are emerging.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">The Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), has expressed cynicism over the military council’s staunch support for the cabinet of Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">“Is it a desire to abort the revolution and destroy the people’s belief in their ability to achieve their goals? Or is there an intention to defraud or influence the forthcoming presidential election?” the Brotherhood’s party asked in a statement. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">“If anyone intends to reproduce the former corrupt regime with new faces, the people are ready to move in order to revive their revolution,” the Islamist party threatened. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">The military and the Brotherhood have worked together – or rather played together – in an often climate of distrust, which never burst into the open until last week. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">Egypt’s military ruler Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi said he could not take it anymore. “We were careful not to be provoked, but what happened recently is enough.” Sounding the warning bell, he called “on all to be aware of history’s lessons not to repeat past mistakes.”</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">At this stage in Egypt’s transition, the Muslim Brotherhood likely realized that it and the military have two different understandings of democracy.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br />
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">Unlike the generals, Islamists want a democracy in which elected officials and public institutions would have full power over the military and the country’s foreign policy. The ruling generals, under pressure from Washington, will never accept this…at least without a fight. It is Israel’s security here which is at stake!</span><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
(Published in English.alarabiya.net on March 2, 2012)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-18893191809502102252012-01-19T19:31:00.000-08:002015-09-05T20:48:34.962-07:00مغرب "الأوراش الكبرى"... إلى أين؟<div style="text-align: right;">
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<span style="font-size: large;"><b><span lang="AR-SA" style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";">مصطفى اجبيلى</span></b></span></div>
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<span lang="AR-MA" style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: large;">ميناء طنجة المتوسط، تي جي في طنجة </span><span dir="LTR" style="font-size: large;">-</span><span lang="AR-MA" style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: large;"> الدار البيضاء، موروكو مول... إلخ، كلها مشاريع كبيرة من شأن أي بلد أن يفتخر بمثلها. لكن إلى أي حد يمكن لمثل هذه المشاريع أن تسهم حقاً في التنمية الاقتصادية للبلد؟ وما مدى نجاعتها في تقليص البطالة ومحاربة الفقر وتعزيز التنمية البشرية في بلد يتذيل بلدان شمال إفريقيا والشرق الأوسط في نسب التعليم؟ </span></div>
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<span lang="AR-MA" style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: large;">من بين عشرات المقالات اليومية في الجرائد المغربية نجد النقد والنقد المضاد في الشأن السياسي والاجتماعي وغيره, دونما التطرق بشكل كافٍ للسياسات الاقتصادية التي ينتهجها البلد. </span></div>
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<span lang="AR-MA" style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: large;">وقد أثار موضوع "الأوراش الكبرى" بالتحديد اهتمامي كونها تكلف دافعي الضرائب في المغرب أموالاً طائلة، وتجعل البلد برمته عبداً دائماً للدول والمؤسسات المالية العالمية المانحة للقروض دون أن تقدم هذه المشاريع "العملاقة" مردوداً إيجابياً ملحوظاً للشعب، خصوصاً الفئات الفقيرة منه. ربما تساعد هذه المشاريع في خلق بضعة آلاف من فرص العمل وتشجيع بعض الاستثمارات الأجنبية هنا وهناك, لكن الثمن باهظ جداً على المغرب. فمعظم تلك المشاريع عبارة عن صفقات سياسية أكثر منها اقتصادية. </span></div>
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<span lang="AR-MA" style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: large;">فمشروع القطار السريع يوهمني بأن المغاربة كلهم في عجلة من أمرهم كي يقطعوا المسافة من طنجة إلى الدار البيضاء في ساعتين عوضاً عن أربع. هذا المشروع - بحسب مراقبين - هو صفقة لإرضاء فرنسا الغاضبة من شراء المغرب طائرات إف 16 الأميركية بدلاً من "رافال" الفرنسية.. ببساطة هكذا تبدو الأمور. فرنسا أقرضت المغرب ملياري يورو كجزء أكبر من ميزانية إنشاء المشروع. ومعظم هذا المبلغ سيعود إلى فرنسا من خلال الشركة الفرنسية المكلفة بإنشاء المشروع والمهندسين الفرنسيين الذين سيعملون في المشرع. </span></div>
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<span lang="AR-MA" style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: large;">هكذا تعمل الدول والمؤسسات الكبرى، تقرض الأموال للدول الفقيرة من خلال اتفاقيات رسمية وتستعيدها في البداية بشكل غير مباشر من خلال شركاتها التي تعمل في إنشاء هذه المشاريع، وبعدها بشكل مباشر حيث تقوم الدول الفقيرة بسداد الديون والفوائد المفروضة عليها، وحين تشتد الأزمات الاجتماعية على هذه الدول الفقيرة وتتخلف عن سداد ديونها في الوقت المطلوب تعاد جدولة هذه الديون بشروط عادة ما تكون سياسية كشراء الذمم في الأمم المتحدة والتبعية المطلقة، أو اقتصادية كفرض مزيد من الفوائد على القروض وفتح المزيد من القطاعات أمام الشركات الغربية، وفى بعض الأحيان تفرض عليك أن تقبل أن تكون مزبلة لنفاياتها النووية أو مستنقعاً لصناعاتها الملوثة للبيئة.. وكل هذا طبعاً باسم التنمية الاقتصادية العمياء. </span></div>
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<span lang="AR-MA" style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: large;">هذا ما يحدث في المغرب للأسف الشديد، نقترض فنتورّط ثم تُفرض علينا شروط من قبيل أن نفتح مولاً كبيراً لتسويق الماركات العالمية وامتصاص المزيد من دماء المغاربة، أو منح هكتارات شاسعة من الأراضي لهذا الغربي أو ذاك الخليجي.</span></div>
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<span lang="AR-MA" style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: large;">أتساءل ما إذا كان بإمكان فرنسا أن تقرضنا ملياري يورو لكي نطور بها صناعاتنا الوطنية ونبني بها مؤسسات لتكوين طاقات بشرية في أعلى المستويات العالمية. غالب الظن أن فرنسا سترفض؛ لأنها لو فعلت ستكون بذلك تساعد المغرب على أن يكون مستقلاً ذاتياً ومنافساً لها ولشركاته ولطاقاتها البشرية. </span></div>
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<span lang="AR-MA" style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: large;">لقد آن الأوان لمن يرعى سياسات التنمية الاقتصادية في المغرب أن يدرك أن المغرب ليس دبي ولا أمريكا لكي يبني مولات وقطارات سريعة تورطنا أكثر مما تفيدنا. فلو كانت فيها فائدة لوجدنا تركيا كلها مولات وقطارات سريعة، فمثل هذه المشاريع عادة ما تكون عبارة عن مظاهر وليس دوافع للازدهار الاقتصادي، وهذا ما يجب أن يدركه المغرب، حسب رأيي المتواضع.</span></div>
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-72680225604406395992011-11-23T03:30:00.001-08:002011-11-23T03:31:46.260-08:00‘Selmy document’ rekindles violence in Egypt, raises calls for army’s swift exit<div class="main_body">
By <b><span style="color: red;">Mustapha Ajbaili</span></b> <br />
<br />
A proposed legislation that sought to shield the Egyptian army
from public scrutiny has rekindled the violence in the country and
increased calls for a speedy exit of the ruling military council from
power.<br />
<br />
Groups across the Egyptian political spectrum, from the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Salafists to secularist el-Ghad Party, rallied in a
million-man march in Tahrir Square last Friday demanding that the
legislation proposed by Egypt’s Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmy be
withdrawn.<br />
<div class="paragTitle">
</div>
<div class="contentParagraph">
<div class="with-margin">
Many suspect that Selmy indirectly proposed the draft law on behalf of the ruling military council.<br />
<br />
At the end of the rally, a few thousand activists decided to camp at
Tahrir Square until their demands were met, prompting a violent move by
military police and security forces to evict the area. The move resulted
in deadly clashes and escalated the situation to popular calls for the
ouster of Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi.<br />
<br />
The excessive approach by security forces to the peaceful protests
evoked the brutality of ousted president Hosni Mubarak and led to
prominent political figures and observers adopting a tougher stance on
the ruling generals and their suspected dubious behind-the-scene plans.<br />
<br />
Tarek al-Bishry, the chairman of Egypt’s constitutional panel, on Monday
described the proposed supra-constitutional principles law as
“invalid”.<br />
<br />
Bishry told Al Arabiya that last Friday’s mass protest at Tahrir Square
“has nullified” the legislation, known as the Selmy document. <br />
<br />
“Selmy is trying to impose a document that has been rejected by the
people and by the political elite. It is, therefore, invalid, and there
is no need for him to talk about making amendments to it,” Bishry said.<br />
<br />
“The important question to ask Selmy is why the persistence on this
document after the Egyptian general public told you we don’t want it;
why the persistence on amending something that has wholly been
rejected?”<br />
<br />
Egyptian presidential candidate and head of el-Ghad party Ayman Nour denounced the military-proposed draft law as unacceptable.<br />
<br />
“We will not allow another dictator to rule the country,” Nour said in comments reported by Egyptian media.<br />
<br />
“We will fight against only one power claiming authority in Egypt. We
will not accept any attempt to divert the attention from the next
parliamentary elections,” he added. <br />
<br />
Veteran Egyptian journalist and political commentator Farrag Ismail
said, “The catastrophe from the ongoing violence in Tahrir Square lies
not in the death toll that continues to rise but in the possibility of
the army containing the revolution by force.<br />
<br />
“Eight months of military rule has given an impression that their
appetite to remain in power has grown despite pledges to transfer power
to civilians.”<br />
<br />
Major General Mohsen al-Fangary has said the Supreme Council of Armed
Forces would relinquish power by the end of 2012 provided there is calm
in the country during the elections.<br />
<br />
Ismail said the condition placed by the army on the transfer of power
was a sign the ruling generals were looking to remain in power.<br />
<br />
The powerful Muslim Brotherhood on Monday called on the Egyptians to be
“alert” against “attempts to re-produce the previous regime in a
different form.”<br />
<br />
Addressing SCAF, the Brotherhood said, “The people entrusted you to lead
the country during the transition period ... and we are not ready to
extend it beyond the second half of 2012.”<br />
<br />
The movement also urged the ruling military council break its silence
and tell the people about their intentions to transfer power to a
civilian authority.</div>
<div class="with-margin">
<br /></div>
<div class="with-margin">
<br /></div>
<div class="with-margin">
<br /></div>
<div class="with-margin">
(Published on english.alarabiya.net on Nov.21, 2011)</div>
</div>
</div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-79774144254437164322011-10-26T11:21:00.000-07:002011-10-26T11:23:14.708-07:00Has Spain switched gear on the Western Sahara conflict?<div class="main_body">
By <b style="color: red;">Mustapha Ajbaili</b><span style="color: red;"> </span><br />
<br />
Spain appeared to have switched gear on its long-time policy
regarding the Western Sahara conflict when it called Tuesday for a U.N.
committee to evaluate the security situation in the Polisario-controlled
refugee camps in Tindouf and probe possible corruption in the
distribution of international aid there. <br />
<br />
“We have asked the United Nations to send a mission to Algeria to assess
the security situation in the camps of Tindouf,” Spanish Foreign
Minister Trinidad Jimenez told reporter after talks in Rabat with her
Moroccan counterpart Taieb Fassi Fihri, Al Arabiya reported.<br />
<br />
<div class="paragTitle">
</div>
<div class="contentParagraph">
<div class="with-margin">
The statement by Jimenez came two
days after two Spanish aid workers and one Italian were kidnapped by
suspected al-Qaeda members in Tindouf, which is under the control of
Polisario Front, which seeks the independence of Western Sahara from
Morocco. Polisario has been largely supported by Algeria, Spain and
Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya. <br />
<br />
Algeria has reportedly deployed both ground and air forces in an
“urgent” operation along its borders with Mauritania, Mali, Niger and
Libya to prevent the escape of the kidnappers.<br />
<br />
Morocco annexed Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony, in 1975 and it
has since become the subject of a dispute with the Polisario Front
backed by Algeria, where many Sahrawis live in refugee camps.<br />
<br />
Morocco has warned several times of suspected cooperation in arms and
drug smuggling between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Polisario
Front. Both Algeria and the Polisario have dismissed the Moroccan
claims as sheer propaganda. Spain supports the secessionist movement,
but often in a way that does not outrage its southern neighbor, Morocco,
with which it enjoys strong economic and security ties. <br />
<br />
Possible corruption in the distribution of international aid or ties
with terror groups or drugs or weapons smuggling networks operating in
the Sahara within the refugees camps controlled by the Polisario will
likely deal a major blow to the movement’s quest for independence from
Morocco.</div>
<div class="with-margin">
<br /></div>
<div class="with-margin">
(Published on English.alarabiya.net on Oct. 25, 2011) </div>
</div>
</div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-13128898650524226652011-10-26T11:15:00.000-07:002011-10-26T11:16:46.713-07:00Mustapha Ajbaili: Libyan NTC chief’s ‘liberation’ speech raises eyebrows<div class="main_body">
By<span style="color: red;"> <b>Mustapha Ajbaili</b></span> <br />
<br />
During his speech at Libya’s ‘liberation’ ceremony held in the
city of Benghazi on Sunday, the head of the interim National
Transitional Council (NTC), Mustafa Abdul Jalil made a few announcements
that must have raised eyebrows among people with hopes for a moderate
system that respects basic human rights and democratic governance of the
country.<br />
<br />
Abdul Jalil began his speech with a religious edict, telling the crowd
that firing guns in the air as a way of thanking Allah for victory is
Haram, meaning prohibited. He then went on to announce that Libya’s
future legal system would be based on Islamic Shariah law, and that
banks will be required to follow the Islamic banking system, which bans
charging interest. But the most seemingly surprising part of the speech
is the NTC chief’s announcement of reinstating polygamy. The statement
highlighted the importance of polygamy in the new Libya, and Abdul
Jalil, an inexperienced politician, evidently did not forget to
“liberate” men in Libya’s day of “liberation.”<br />
<div class="paragTitle">
</div>
<div class="contentParagraph">
<div class="with-margin">
If Libyan women, who make up more
than half of the country’s population, were asked to vote on a polygamy
law, most of them would likely oppose it. Polygamy is a practice most
Muslim women detest, but remain silent about it for fear they would be
accused of going against Shariah. <br />
<br />
When Libyans rose up against Muammar Qaddafi and fought eight months of
war, with tremendous sacrifices, they did so for the sake of dignity and
self-rule. If they want a legal system based on the Islamic Shariah
law, they have the right to have it through a democratic process; it
should not be imposed on them. <br />
<br />
The NTC chairman enjoys wide support in Libya. He was one of the first
to desert Qaddafi’s regime when he gave up his post as justice minister
and joined revolutionaries in Benghazi. Since then, Abdul Jalil has had
“revolutionary legitimacy” to represent Libyans and make urgent
decisions on their behalf. In order for him to be able to make
decisions on how Libyans should be governed for years to come, he now
needs “electoral legitimacy.” <br />
<br />
Abdul Jalil’s “liberation” speech should have been a historic one.
Instead of reminding Libyans of the lofty principles of democracy,
freedom, dignity, and nation-building, he addressed details that should
be left for elected lawmakers to discuss.<br />
<br />
But it should be noted that Abdul Jalil is an inexperienced politician;
and both Libyan and international observers should cut him some slack.
He has made some blunders before. </div>
<div class="with-margin">
<br /></div>
<div class="with-margin">
(Published on English.alarabiya.net on Oct. 24, 2011) </div>
</div>
</div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-77112533541046703672011-10-07T13:13:00.000-07:002011-10-07T13:13:19.384-07:00What’s behind division in U.N. Security Council on Syria?<div class="main_body"> <div style="color: red;">By <b>Mustapha Ajbaili</b> </div>The often muted rivalry between Russia and China, on one side, and Western powers, on the other, honed into a clash in the United Nations Security Council this week when the eastern powers vetoed what would have been the first legally-binding resolution against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad since the start of the uprising in Syria.<br />
<br />
American ambassador to the U.N. Susan E. Rice delivered a combative response to the Russian and Chinese decisions, accusing the two countries of wanting to continue arms sales to Syria at the expense of civilians demanding freedom. “During this season of change, the people of the Middle East can now see clearly which nations have chosen to ignore their calls for democracy and instead prop up desperate, cruel dictators,” Rice said.<br />
<div class="paragTitle"> </div><div class="contentParagraph"> <div class="with-margin">The last time Russia and China together vetoed a U.N. council resolution was in 2008 when they opposed proposed sanctions against Zimbabwe. Their latest move reflects serious fears of increased Western influence and domination in the Middle East and highlights Syria's strategic importance between rival world powers.<br />
<br />
“Both countries are known for brutal crackdowns on dissent. Both will lose out if the Assad regime goes. Both have military trade and other economic interest with Syria. Both have close relations with Syria's big brother, Iran. Both are hedging their bets that Assad will survive this. Both countries will be shut out of Syria for some time after Assad is ousted,” said Paul Sullivan, professor of economics at National Defense University and an adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University.<br />
<br />
Asked why Syria, unlike Libya, turned out to be so divisive in the Security Council, veteran journalist and Professor Emeritus at the American University in Cairo, Abdallah Schleifer, said both countries were concerned “that a U.N. Resolution might provide the justification for a subsequent American or Anglo-American-French intervention in Syria, since the intervention in Libya has turned out to be successful at minimal cost and now America has a positive relationship with the new leaders of Libya.<br />
<br />
“Even commanders of the revolutionary Libyan forces with Islamist backgrounds have good words for America, and both Russia and China are rivals for world influence with the Americans-though at present Syria does not resemble Libya,” Schleifer added.<br />
<br />
He said that what made U.S. intervention a success story in Libya was that a rebel political authority existed in Benghazi, and not in Istanbul as is the case of the Syrian opposition leadership; this was made possible because there was enough of a cohesive armed rebel force to have liberated Benghazi and that too doesn't exist in Syria.<br />
<br />
“A more likely reason is that both Russia and China are nervous about any U.N. interventions, be they peace protests or sanctions since both countries have their own local uprisings in outlying districts to contend with,” Schleifer said.<br />
<br />
Russia and China have expressed concern that a more aggressive approach towards Syria will only throw the region into unpredictable turmoil, especially since Syria shares borders with Israel and has strong allies in the region, mainly Hezbollah and Iran. By saying they are afraid of more people being killed if tough measures are taken against Assad, Russia and China sought to coat their stances in a humanitarian perspective, which is essentially what the West has been doing for a long time.<br />
<br />
On the surface the difference between the two camps appears to be clear. The West says Assad must be punished because he kills; Russia and China say if he is punished there will be more killings. However, differences on humanitarian issues, as the Syrian one is proclaimed to be, often rarely develop into bitter disputes in the United Nations. Often times, only deeply strategic issues involving major geopolitical and economic interests provoke such bitter rebukes in the United Nations.</div><div class="with-margin"><br />
</div><div class="with-margin">(Published on http://english.alarabiya.net/ Oct. 08, 2011) </div></div></div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-59502620451228501462011-10-04T10:09:00.000-07:002011-10-04T10:09:49.483-07:00Is Syria heading towards civil war?<div class="main_body"> <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/--C5_AC-QDNE/Tos9o93pUKI/AAAAAAAAAMk/c0tARGB-Lf4/s1600/Syria.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/--C5_AC-QDNE/Tos9o93pUKI/AAAAAAAAAMk/c0tARGB-Lf4/s320/Syria.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
By <span style="color: red;">Mustapha Ajbaili </span><br />
<br />
The latest series of assassinations in Syria, including the recent murder of the son of the grand mufti, reveals a muddled and complex picture of the state of the uprising in the country. The killings could lead Syria spiraling down the path of a bloody civil war, with sectarian vendettas likely to characterize the next chapter of the revolution. If, however, it turns out that President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is behind the targeted murders, these acts will likely backfire and unite religious sects against the regime. <br />
<br />
The flashpoint city of Homs was last week the scene of several targeted assassinations. On Sept. 25, a surgeon at Homs’ general hospital, Hassan Eid, was shot dead as he got into his car. Aws Abdel Karim Khalil, a nuclear engineering specialist and charge d’affaires at al-Baath University, was gunned down as his wife drove him to work. Mohammad Ali Aqil, deputy dean of the architecture faculty, and Nael Dakhil, director of the military petrochemical school, were also killed last week, both the Syrian official news agency and activists reported. <br />
<br />
Khalil and Eid are said to belong to the Alawite sect of Islam, to which Assad is also affiliated, while Aqil was a Shiite Muslim and Dakhil a Christian.<br />
<div class="paragTitle"> </div><div class="contentParagraph"> <div class="with-margin">It is possible that armed dissidents were targeting suspected regime informants and collaborators. But it is equally possible that the regime was carrying out targeted killings against leading members of minority Shiite, Alawite and Christian sects to create tensions between them and the majority Sunni Muslims. If the revolution develops into a sectarian war, the regime will likely present itself as an independent party seeking to unite a divided nation and thus emerge as victorious in the mayhem. <br />
<br />
Anti-government activists have repeatedly accused the regime of attempting to derail the revolution by pitting religious sects against each other. A statement posted on Syria’s Youth Forum (shababsyria.org) on Monday denied any knowledge of the person(s) behind the murder of the grand mufti’s son. Although the forum described the mufti as a “heretic apostate” who collaborates with the regime, it said Salafist Islamists and armed dissidents were unlikely to be behind his son’s death because these groups do not want to be seen as inciting sectarianism. Al-Ghad, a coalition of dissidents, has held the regime responsible for the targeted assassinations in Homs, according to AFP. The coalition said that these have “failed to provoke confessional discord in Homs and is again trying to arouse it by targeting these scientific personalities.” <br />
<br />
But a statement by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights suggested that “extremists” possibly among dissidents could be responsible for the murders. The group called on “everyone to denounce and stop extremists from committing such acts of violence.” </div><div class="with-margin"><br />
</div><div class="with-margin">(Published in http://english.alarabiya.net on Oct. 3, 2011.)</div></div></div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-9370728887394237292011-09-26T02:56:00.000-07:002011-09-26T02:56:44.179-07:00Arab Revolts and the Western role<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-SUcrl02PZho/ToBMHRN3kHI/AAAAAAAAAMg/CKaNfHUWz-Q/s1600/Clinton1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-SUcrl02PZho/ToBMHRN3kHI/AAAAAAAAAMg/CKaNfHUWz-Q/s320/Clinton1.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
By: <span style="color: red;">Mustapha Ajbaili</span><br />
<br />
This past Tuesday I attended a lecture by the Swiss Muslim public intellectual Tariq Ramadan on the future of Political Islam in The Arab World. In reflection on the revolutions taking place in the Arab world, Ramadan said that we should neither be naive to think that what is happening is an entirely innocent and domestic cry for freedom, nor be blinded by conspiracy theories that blame the West for all mishaps of the Muslim world.<br />
<br />
As he tried to situate himself in the “middle,” Ramadan appeared to fall, possibly unconsciously, into the same pit he was trying to avoid, namely, the extreme. He dedicated most of his speech to the Western influence on the Muslim uprisings, pointing to the participation of Arab youth in U.S.-funded training programs on online public mobilization, blogging and citizen journalism. He also mentioned Google’s role in making available several creative tools people in Egypt could use to get around the shutdown of communications by Hosni Mubarak’s government.<br />
<br />
<div class="paragTitle"></div>Ramadan added that the Western interference to bring about change in the Middle East is part of a strategic struggle for domination over the Middle East between the West on one side and China and china on the other. He said the West is encouraging uprisings in the Middle East because in part dictators there were moving closer and closer to China and Russia, which, unlike the West, do not ask for democratic reforms as preconditions for economic partnerships<br />
<br />
This argument appears rather simplistic, because in varying degrees neither China and Russia, nor the United States, France, and Britain, take democratic reforms much into account when signing economic deals with other nations. In fact, Western countries have notorious track records of cooperating with the most brutal dictators on the planet. In democratic capitalist countries, foreign policy double standards are the norm, with the latest example being Muammar Qaddafi of Libya.<br />
<br />
Documents found in the Libyan regime’s intelligence ministry after the fall of Tripoli revealed a meeting between two Qaddafi officials and David Welsh, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state) who brokered the normalization of ties between the Qaddafi regime and the George W. Bush administration. Welsh was reportedly providing public relations services to the Qaddafi regime three weeks before rebels overran Tripoli with the help of NATO. <br />
<br />
Other documents exposed security and business cooperation between Western governments and Qaddafi’s regime. All three deposed dictators – Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt and Qaddafi – enjoyed in varying degrees comfortable ties with the West before the uprisings that ousted them. If Western powers were interested in changing dictators in the Middle East as Ramadan argues, it would have made sense for them to go after Syria or Iran first rather than allies in Tunisia and Egypt.<br />
<br />
The fact the West is backing revolutions in the Arab world does not necessarily mean that they contributed to their rise. It could simply mean being on the right side of history. They did not want to commit the same mistake France did when it stood with Ben Ali of Tunisia. Western powers now watch the revolts, and when the winner becomes clear enough, they jump on his side. Noam Chomsky explains this by saying that the “playbook” of American foreign policy concerning dictators reads thusly: “Whenever a favored dictator is in trouble, try to sustain him, hold on; if at some point it becomes impossible, switch sides.”Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-26645909599219967692011-09-01T09:31:00.000-07:002011-09-15T09:39:38.752-07:00What is behind Algeria’s stance on Libya’s National Transitional Council?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-90TAFC9_CPs/TnIo-ChjfdI/AAAAAAAAAMc/M3ES-3OKYfI/s1600/640x392_95558_164981.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-90TAFC9_CPs/TnIo-ChjfdI/AAAAAAAAAMc/M3ES-3OKYfI/s320/640x392_95558_164981.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><span style="color: red;">By: Mustapha Ajbaili</span><br />
<br />
The nascent political leadership in Libya has found itself in an early, simmering diplomatic row with neighboring Algeria, sparked when the latter refused to recognize the National Transitional Council (NTC), as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people, until it forms a government and pledges to fight al-Qaeda. <br />
<br />
The NTC has reacted to Algeria’s position with strongly worded statements from several council members. NTC spokesman Mahmoud Shamman denounced Algeria’s position as an act of aggression.<br />
<br />
<br />
<div class="with-margin">“We have promised to provide a just trial to all those criminals and therefore we consider this an act of aggression,” Shamman was quoted by the Tripoli Post as saying. “We are warning anybody not to shelter Qaddafi and his sons. We are going after them ... to find them and arrest them.” <br />
<br />
Rebel army spokesman Col. Ahmed Bani said Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika “does not even recognize the law of God,” so it is not surprising he does not recognize the NTC.</div><div class="paragTitle"></div><div class="contentParagraph"><div class="with-margin">Algeria said it was afraid that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), whose members had fought the state in the 1990s under the banner of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, might exploit the unrest in Libya to obtain weapons and plan terrorist attacks. The authorities in Algiers even suspect that some al-Qaeda members were fighting alongside the rebels against Col. Qaddafi.<br />
<br />
While the Algerian fears are not entirely preposterous, they do not clearly account for the stance against the rebels in Libya. <br />
<br />
Algeria’s refusal, or rather hesitation, to recognize the NTC is likely better understood in the light of the changing political dynamics and shift of alliances in North Africa with the fall of Qaddafi. <br />
<br />
Qaddafi has long been allied with Algeria in funding, arming and providing political support for the Polisario Front, which is seeking the separation of Western Sahara from Morocco. Qaddafi and the Algerian government had lobbied successfully to bring the separatist movement into the African Union, prompting Morocco to withdraw. <br />
<br />
Now, since the crisis in Libya began, Morocco has supported the rebels, albeit not too overtly. Rabat has participated in all Libya Contact Group meetings and supported an Arab League call for imposing the No-Fly Zone over Libya. A day after Tripoli was overrun by rebel forces, Morocco dispatched its foreign minister to Benghazi and recognized the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. <br />
<br />
The NTC expressed appreciation for the swift move on the part of Morocco and promised to support Morocco’s stance on the Western Sahara issue and cease cooperation with the Polisario Front. <br />
<br />
So with Qaddafi out of power, Algeria finds itself isolated. It will now have to bear most of the burden in dealing with the Polisario Front. Besides, with the winds of freedom blowing in North Africa – Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco are all in the midst of rapid change – Algeria remains a quasi-socialist, reclusive dictatorial military regime that is unlikely to integrate with its neighbors in building common regional economic and political policies. </div></div>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0Dubai Media City - Dubai - United Arab Emirates25.092541857965351 55.15443376208497725.074953857965351 55.135255262084975 25.110129857965351 55.17361226208498tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-9481566620311569282011-06-30T04:59:00.000-07:002011-06-30T05:02:17.727-07:00Mustapha Ajbaili: To whom this may concern: Social problems as contagious as epidemics<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-DUFZMD3eNw0/TgxlLfRgfSI/AAAAAAAAAMA/qsJLQquEmII/s1600/Egypt.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" i$="true" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-DUFZMD3eNw0/TgxlLfRgfSI/AAAAAAAAAMA/qsJLQquEmII/s320/Egypt.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
<br />
<span style="color: red;">MUSTAPHA AJBAILI</span><br />
<br />
In today’s fast-moving news cycles we accept—not expect—that things will change at any moment and will do so in a dramatic fashion. And we accept that change is looming, often not by design but due to the intrinsic volatility of our social, economic and political system/systems.<br />
<br />
The unrest that has swept the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) shows that the traditional forces of domination, often entrenched through opaque internal politics, are in fact vulnerable to measly social earthquakes.<br />
The unrest shows also that we now live in a world where no one is in charge. Revolutions, wars, economic crises are no longer but predictable, they are also part of our reality. The very recent developments in the telecommunication industry, primarily the Internet, have turned social and economic phenomena into epidemics. They have become like measles, little of which can spread like wildfire. They are contagious and their change can be dramatic, not gradual. <br />
<br />
It took 13 years of sanctions, total embargo, and devastating wars to topple Saddam Hussein. It took two months for the popular anger to oust two dictators in the Middle East and drive three others to the verge of collapse, the point of no return, the tipping point of dramatic change.<br />
<br />
Today, any popular demonstration—no matter how small it is—and any individual wrath is contagious and can consume our social jungle and shatter its laws. The lessons are for whom this may concern.<br />
<br />
(Published in English.alarabiya.net June 29, 2011)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-74921015527168195542011-06-25T13:33:00.000-07:002011-06-25T13:33:01.314-07:00Mustapha Ajbaili: ‘Welcome home,’ said the gendarme in my native Morocco<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-R3QvVG57JDs/TgZF1W8FIcI/AAAAAAAAAL4/a94k55UJSM8/s1600/Mustafa.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-R3QvVG57JDs/TgZF1W8FIcI/AAAAAAAAAL4/a94k55UJSM8/s320/Mustafa.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
<br />
<span style="color: red;">MUSTAPHA AJBAILI</span><br />
<br />
Driving on a curvy and dangerous road along one side of a deep gorge carving of a mountain range toward the south of Morocco, I was pulled over by a Royal Gendarmerie officer forming a security checkpoint in the entrance of the city of Bouizakarne. The officer saluted me and asked me to step out of the car and join him inside the gendarmerie office built on the roadside. <br />
<br />
It was my first time ever to be pulled over by a police officer while driving in Morocco. Inside the building, the young officer asked if I knew why I was pulled over. The only reason I could think of was that I overtook a truck while driving on a section of the road now left behind. But my reason seemed to lack some logical sense because I was the fourth in a series of drivers who all overtook the truck when the road appeared to be sufficiently clear ahead; yet no other one of those drivers was stopped at the checkpoint. I told the officer the reason I had in mind, anyway.<br />
<div class="paragTitle"> </div>“Yes, that is why I stopped you,” he said. <br />
<br />
“But excuse me, officer, are you being selective in implementing justice?” I replied.<br />
<br />
He stretched his right hand and grabbed my papers I had placed on his table. After examining my papers, he said, “Welcome home, this is how it goes here.” <br />
<br />
He proceeded with the question, “What do you do in Dubai?”<br />
<br />
“I am a journalist,” I replied and handed him my journalist ID card.<br />
<br />
“Ahhh, you are a shadow soldier,” he said.<br />
<br />
[silence] <br />
“And how much do you get paid over there?” he asked.<br />
<br />
“I will tell you, if you promise not to fine me,” I said.<br />
<br />
He smiled, handed back the papers to me and wished me safe trip. <br />
<br />
I stood up, walked a few steps and stopped. I turned my head toward him and asked, “By the way, how do you people know if someone does a traffic violation in those mountains…any hidden cameras?”<br />
<br />
“We have a man sitting on that cliff and watching cars driving through that curvy road. He calls us if he sees someone does something wrong,” the officer said. <br />
<br />
I laughed and walked out. <br />
<br />
“I told you welcome home,” the officer shouted.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-11567313949649787962011-06-20T15:09:00.000-07:002011-06-20T15:09:13.323-07:00Mustapha Ajbaili: What to do about Morocco’s youth movement? Rebranding needed, of course<span style="color: red;"></span><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/hxEjgH213LM?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div><br />
<span style="color: red;">MUSTAPHA AJBAILI</span><br />
<span style="color: red;"> </span> <br />
When Morocco’s pro-democracy movement first took to the streets on February 20, the government was fighting a war behind the scenes to destroy it, while in the meantime it was embracing it in public.<br />
<br />
On the one hand, security services and their servants tried to sow divisions within the group and launched a smear online media campaign against it. On the other hand, they were embracing it in public. During a visit to Washington, Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri said, referring to the group, “We are proud of them.” The government initially did not expect a movement born in the sphere of virtual communication to gain momentum and reach a level where it would threaten its political agenda and the interests of those in power.<br />
<div class="paragTitle"> </div><br />
In the recent weeks, when the movement grew in power and became seriously challenging to the status quo, authorities started to brand it as a collective mass of extremists made up mainly of the outlawed Islamist Justice and Charity Group and the Marxist Democratic Path.<br />
<br />
These groups are perceived as threats to the democratic process, and because they are part of the February 20 movement the latter is also lately portrayed as an obstacle to stability and to the alleged democratic course taken by the government. By the government I mean the ruling establishment not the cabinet, which is made up of ministers who come and go.<br />
<br />
Following last Friday’s speech by King Mohammed VI in which he unveiled a daft constitution and called upon political parties to mobilize the people to vote “yes” for the project in a referendum scheduled for July 1, there was speculation that the protest movement would disintegrate as the demands of some of its components, mainly the Amazigh cultural movement, were allegedly answered in recognizing Amaizgh as an official language of Morocco.<br />
<br />
The speculation proved inaccurate as thousands of people took to the streets in different cities to denounce the constitutional reforms and to demand a genuine democratic change in the country.<br />
<br />
Almost all the components of the February 20 movement criticized the draft constitution and called the changes cosmetic. The giant masses of people who marched peacefully in the cities of Casablanca, Tangiers, Fes and even Marrakesh, which is still recovering from the shock of a terrorist attack, are a proof that the conflict between the establishment and the opposition is still alive. Even more, the protests and the recent government reaction to them signaled that Morocco is going down a dangerous slope. <br />
<br />
The establishment will rely on the elites revolving in its orbit and on the majority illiterate and low-educated masses to support the constitutional reforms. But the educated people from student unions and opposition groups, who tend to be conduits of political change, are unlikely to be tamed. <br />
<br />
Before the draft constitution is passed, I see that there is a door of opportunity to revise things and engage in an honest dialogue with the only real opposition group we currently have in Morocco, the February 20 movement. After the constitution is passed, the chances to diffuse tension will be less.<br />
<br />
(Published in english.alarabiya.net on June 20)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-83398544085033807232011-06-19T16:07:00.000-07:002011-06-19T16:11:45.354-07:00Morocco’s opposition youth group beaten in Rabat, protests in other cities<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/sEzWJqBgtgk?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span class="reporter-names" style="color: red;"> </span><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-CIxdnjHtGRg/Tf5-m0jRR5I/AAAAAAAAAL0/l-QShc6rnmQ/s1600/Morocco.jpg-pan.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">For the first time in Morocco, protesters call for regime change</a></div><br />
<br />
<span class="reporter-names" style="color: red;">MUSTAPHA AJBAILI</span> <br />
<span class="source-names"></span><br />
<span class="source-names"><br />
</span> <br />
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</script> </div>Activists of a Moroccan pro-democracy youth group were broken up in the capital Rabat on Sunday as they prepared to hold a protest march against a draft constitution unveiled by King Mohammad VI two days ago, two members of the group from Rabat said in a telephone interview with Al Arabiya. <br />
<br />
The security forces and dozens of “recruited thugs” attacked members of the February 20 movement who had gathered in Taqaddom neighborhood in Rabat to protest against the draft constitution in which the King seemed to have relinquished some of his executive and legislative powers, Najib Shawki said.<br />
<div class="paragTitle"></div><br />
Mr. Shawki added that after 40 members of the group were wounded, the activists decided to withdraw in order to avoid more casualties. <br />
<br />
Another activist, Jalal Al Makhfi, said the security forces have used “thugs” for the first time to clamp down on demonstrations organized by the youth group. “Agents and servants of the interior ministry have recruited thugs and paid them money for the first time to attack our demonstrations throughout the country,” he said.<br />
But a security source who refused to be named denied the government recruited people to attack protesters or to demonstrate in support of the draft constitution. He added that “ordinary residents may have chased away those who want to cause unrest in their neighborhood.”<br />
<br />
Mr. Makhfi said protesters in the cities of Casablanca, Fes, Asfi and Tangier were also subject to similar harassment but that in those cities the youth activists were able to hold on and continue their rallies.<br />
<br />
The groups said in Facebook page that about 25,000 people had joined the protest in the country’s biggest city, Casablanca. <br />
<br />
All government officials—including senior ministers—and virtually political parties of this country of about 32 million people have voiced support for the new draft constitution, which will be put to referendum on July 1. (Morocco’s GDP is about $154 billion, and the per capita income is about $5,000.)<br />
<br />
Under the new draft constitution, the king would remain head of state and the military and still appoint ambassadors and diplomats, while retaining the right to name top officials of unspecified “strategic” administrations.<br />
<br />
The prime minister, now to be called the “president of the government,” will have the power to dissolve parliament, hitherto the monarch’s prerogative. <br />
Mohammed VI also pledged an independent judiciary.<br />
<br />
The 47-year-old monarch, who took over the Arab world’s longest-serving dynasty in 1999, currently holds virtually all power in the Muslim North African country, and he is also its top religious authority as the Commander of the Faithful.<br />
<br />
(Published in English.alarabiya.net on June 19)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-57164300180657372232011-06-18T15:09:00.000-07:002011-06-18T15:09:32.443-07:00How progressive is Morocco monarch’s proposed constitutional change? Not very<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-siPz-De-_g0/Tf0h7a8V-lI/AAAAAAAAALw/TdmkYUV7Csg/s1600/Morocco.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-siPz-De-_g0/Tf0h7a8V-lI/AAAAAAAAALw/TdmkYUV7Csg/s320/Morocco.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><span style="color: red;">MUSTAPHA AJBAILI</span><br />
<br />
<br />
I waited eagerly for hours to watch the King of Morocco unveil a new draft constitution according to which my country will be governed for years to come. The king described the draft constitution as progressive. The national media and the predominantly domesticated political parties said it was advanced, democratic and even revolutionary.<br />
<br />
For me and for thousands of those Moroccans who have dreamed of a democratic constitution that grants the power to the people, the unveiled reforms were indeed progressive. But the question is, how progressive are they? <br />
<br />
<div class="paragTitle"></div>The answer is: Very little. I found the long-awaited royal speech quite disappointing in many ways. <br />
<br />
It was designed to stave off democratic protests that have swept the Arab world and was expected to introduce fundamental reforms that would strengthen an elected government, strip the king of many religious and political powers and ensure the separation of powers, including judicial independence. <br />
<br />
But as I read the draft constitution, I discovered that the king has barely surrendered any meaningful powers. <br />
<br />
The draft constitution elevates the prime minister to the “head of government’’ and ensures he is selected by the king from the party that received the most votes. Previously the prime minister is selected by the king regardless of election results. <br />
<br />
The head of government will have the new powers of choosing and dismissing cabinet members—with the approval of the king—and will be able to fill a number of other government positions. The selection, however, of the powerful regional governors will remain in the King’s hands.<br />
<br />
The king will also remain the supreme commander of the armed forces and the “commander of the faithful.” <br />
<br />
The new constitution introduced the Supreme Security Council — which will make security policy—and it will be chaired by the King. <br />
<br />
The unveiled constitutional amendments are undoubtedly progressive, but they are insufficient to satiate popular demands for reform. The King remains to have almost indefinite ruling powers. He appoints the cabinet (executive), can dismiss the parliament (the legislative) and he is the head of the Supreme Judicial Council. Besides, he has the military and security forces in his hand. <br />
<br />
To make sure his new draft constitution is passed, the king called for a “yes” vote in a referendum to be held on July 1. He also instructed political parties and media to campaign for the project. <br />
<br />
In response, the youth-led February 20 movement, which has brought thousands of people onto the streets in unprecedented calls for change, has opposed the constitutional reforms, which it described as cosmetic. The group called for nationwide protests on Sunday against what sees as a “granted” constitution.<br />
<br />
The group is unlikely to cease demonstrating in the streets, and if it continues to do so, the regime will eventually lose its patience and will likely resort to cracking down on protesters. The consequences of this are unpredictable, but violence only yields violence. <br />
<br />
(Published in english.alarabiya.net June 18, 2011)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-86236560142664406632011-06-13T06:13:00.000-07:002011-06-14T06:16:27.472-07:00Mustapha Ajbaili: Erdoğan and Turkey’s quest for greatness<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0k3-Bxf6GTk/TfdfAbZ4QoI/AAAAAAAAALU/mE_Y7ZJwmHM/s1600/640x392_74920_153178.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0k3-Bxf6GTk/TfdfAbZ4QoI/AAAAAAAAALU/mE_Y7ZJwmHM/s320/640x392_74920_153178.jpg" t8="true" width="320" /></a></div>MUSTAPHA AJBAILI <br />
<br />
<br />
Al Arabiya<br />
<br />
I spent one day in Istanbul on my way from Dubai to Morocco last month. I stayed in a two-floor house converted into a pension located on a charming, cobblestoned street in a quiet area of Istanbul’s historic Sultanahmet district. The owner, Orhan, greeted me with a Turkish cup of tea, and then we began talking about the change taking place in the Arab world.<br />
As we spoke, an election campaign van passed by. The van bore the slogan of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) “İstikrar sürsün” (let the stability continue). I asked Mr. Orhan if Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would be re-elected. He replied: “Oh yeah, there is no doubt about this. With Erdoğan, Turkey will be great again.” <br />
<br />
For the ordinary man, Orhan, elections in Turkey were not merely about improving economic conditions or creating more jobs but more about restoring to the nation the greatness it had once enjoyed during the Ottoman Empire.<br />
<br />
Mr. Orhan’s remarks made me reflect on the history of the power struggle in Turkey and how differing parties all unite around the common goal of building a great state.<br />
<br />
Modern Turkey came to being following a war of liberation fought by Turkish nationalists against the Allies. Turkey was partitioned by the Allies following the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I.<br />
<br />
The Ottoman Sultanate was overthrown and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk came to power seeking to build a great state. Most successive leaders followed Mr. Kemal’s quest and ambition to build a great state but none was ever compared to him as Mr. Erdoğan has been. <br />
<br />
Suzy Hansen, an American journalist based in Istanbul recently wrote of Mr. Erdoğan: “By now, Erdoğan is more than merely popular. He is a once-in-a-lifetime phenomenon, with all the political genius of a Bill Clinton and none of the personal excess […] If the AKP wins the June 12 elections, as is widely expected, Erdoğan will become the most powerful Turkish leader since Kemal Atatürk.” <br />
<br />
(Mustapha Ajbaili, a senior editor at Al Arabiya English, can be reached at Mustapha.ajbaili@mbc.net)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-69289546718184366612011-06-12T07:05:00.000-07:002011-06-13T07:07:02.097-07:00Mustapha Ajbaili: In Morocco, ‘Say the year is good!’<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-6xe_804Zvko/TfYZTJlksYI/AAAAAAAAALI/2hoYn-jIL34/s1600/Morocco.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-6xe_804Zvko/TfYZTJlksYI/AAAAAAAAALI/2hoYn-jIL34/s320/Morocco.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
<br />
During a two-week visit to the North African Kingdom of Morocco, there have been music festivals of international grandeur, royal inaugurations of development projects and soccer celebrations across the country. The events widely publicized in the national broadcast media conveyed an image of normalcy being enjoyed by a country situated in a region swept by revolutions and social unrest.<br />
<br />
But this type of publicity is often described by ordinary people as part of an official policy known as “goulou al-aam zeen” (Say the year is good!). This policy, people say, imposes a blackout on what the “Makhzan”—a word used to refer to the ruling establishment—sees as the kingdom’s dark side, which if brought to light could spur unrest, hurt the economy and the image of the regime abroad.<br />
<br />
<br />
Indeed, there have been many more developments in the kingdom but these have received comparatively little media attention despite their high newsworthiness. There have been pro-democracy protests all over the country, brutal security crackdowns, and quasi paralysis in the sectors of health, education, judiciary and fisheries due to repeated nationwide strikes. Even the imams leading religious prayers in mosques have taken to the streets for the first time to demand better treatment by the government.<br />
<br />
King Mohammed VI, the commander in chief of the armed forces and the “commander of the faithful,” distances himself from those problems, leaving an incapable government to deal with them. He appears on the national TV channels to highlight achievements and to deliver beautiful tidings. Watching the national media it takes no brilliance to recognize that the “good things” are attributed to the king and the “the bad things” are attributed to the government and to “radical elements” of the civil society. But regardless of who does what, the national broadcast media often highlight three active parties in the Morocco’s political scene—the king, the government and the civil society. The “makhzan”—or the hidden hand is never a player in the game.<br />
<br />
At the time of writing hundreds of school teachers across the nation are in an open strike. They describe themselves as prisoners in “cell number nine.” Most of them have spent years in “grade nine” and have never been promoted to “grade 10” at a time when the ministry of education occasionally recruits waves of unemployed graduates straight to grade 10.<br />
<br />
According to the law, a person first has to undergo a period of training as a teacher before he or she can be sent to class but the minister of education has issued exceptions to unemployed graduates constantly demonstrating before the parliament and government buildings and placed them in grade number 10, thereby angering teachers who have undergone training and still in grade number nine. Was the education minister not aware that his decision would plunge his sector into turmoil? A few teachers who spoke with the writer said it was impossible that the minister was not aware of his wrongdoing but that he had “no choice.”<br />
<br />
“Our ministers have no choice, they do what they are asked to do and shut up even if it is wrong. When a problem breaks out in a government sector, the responsible minister can only wait for a call from the hidden man of the makhzan to tell him what to do,” a school teacher said.<br />
<br />
Today there is much talk about a new constitution, the separation of powers and the institution of a system of regionalism that seeks to buttress local governance. Some people say the new reforms will take the nation to new heights in democracy building. Others cast a jaundiced eye on the anticipated reforms saying what the country needs most is strong law enforcement on all without exceptions.<br />
<br />
On Friday, June 10, a columnist at Al Massae newspaper, whose executive editor was recently handed a one-year jail term for “criticizing the performance of the security forces,” asked whether it was acceptable for the interior ministry to crackdown on unauthorized peaceful demonstration demanding reforms while allowing another unauthorized demonstration to celebrate a soccer victory—a legitimate question that highlights a law enforcement problem.<br />
<br />
(Mustapha Ajbaili, a senior editor at Al Arabiya English, can be reached at Mustapha.ajbaili@mbc.net)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-27404769094277165322011-05-20T01:27:00.000-07:002011-05-20T01:29:06.077-07:00The Obama Speech: Israel rejects peace plan, Palestinians wary, Arabs indifferent<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-cXCBj5BFDPU/TdYmRroJEEI/AAAAAAAAAKw/ajpC8y-83P0/s1600/Obama.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" j8="true" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-cXCBj5BFDPU/TdYmRroJEEI/AAAAAAAAAKw/ajpC8y-83P0/s320/Obama.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
<br />
<span style="color: red;"><strong>MUSTAPHA AJBAILI </strong></span><br />
<br />
President Barack Obama initially didn’t quite get the enthusiastic response in the Arab world that some of his supporters may have expected as he outlined his vision of US foreign policy in the Middle East against the backdrop of pro-democracy uprisings sweeping the region. <br />
<br />
Some Arab media pundits saw the Obama speech, the steps he has taken to impose sanctions on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and his pledge of support for the nascent democracies in Egypt and Tunisia, as encouraging and demonstrate a change in the US foreign policy.<br />
<br />
But other commentators said the speech reflected the same time-honored US foreign policy approach of supporting a favored dictator until it became clear that he was losing control—then switching sides, claiming to be on the side of people, providing aid and doing whatever possible to re-instate the old system under a different name. In politics this is called: being on the right side of history.<br />
<br />
Commenting on President Obama’s speech both Amr Hashem Rabie, of Al‐Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, and Hisham Melhem, the Washington bureau chief of Al Arabiya, agreed that the initiative in the Middle East today was in the hands of the people regardless of whether the US was genuinely siding with the people or not.<br />
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The Kuwaiti newspaper Al Rai revealed on Thursday that during a discussion earlier this week between President Obama and Jordan’s King's Abdullah II, the two leaders agreed that “It was impossible for the Assad regime to survive,” and that “the attention of Washington and its allies should now be focused on ensuring a smooth power transition stage in Syria.”<br />
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The newspaper quoted Tony Badran, expert on Syria, Lebanon and Hezbollah at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, saying, “Assad’s regime is finished” and that “it may hold on for a few months or more but it will eventually surrender to the wide opposition to its rule.” <br />
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This, according to the newspaper, explains the shift of the US policy toward Mr. Assad. President Obama seeks to position the United States on the side of the winner—the people.<br />
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In his speech, President Obama made it clear that the goals of the US Mideast foreign policy will remain the same, but that the strategy to achieve those goals will need to be fine-tuned. <br />
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“The question before us is what role America will play as this story unfolds. For decades, the United States has pursued a set of core interests in the region: countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; securing the free flow of commerce, and safe-guarding the security of the region; standing up for Israel’s security and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace,” President Obama said. <br />
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He added that the US “will continue to do these things” but in a slightly different way. <br />
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“We must also build on our efforts to broaden our engagement beyond elites, so that we reach the people who will shape the future—particularly young people,” Mr. Obama said. <br />
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Israel on Thursday rejected President Obama’s call for a peace deal based the 1967 borders, as the Palestinians said their leadership would hold a meeting to discuss the US leader's policy speech.<br />
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Mr. Obama’s address, billed as an announcement of reoriented US policy in the Middle East after a slew of regional uprisings, focused heavily on the stalled talks between Israel and the Palestinians.<br />
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He called for a negotiated solution based on the borders that existed before the 1967 Six Day War, but also warned the Palestinians that a bid for UN recognition of a unilateral proclamation of statehood would not work.<br />
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“The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states,” said Mr. Obama. “The Palestinian people must have the right to govern themselves, and reach their full potential, in a sovereign and contiguous state.”<br />
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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, due to fly to Washington just hours after Mr. Obama’s speech, immediately called on the White House to guarantee Israel would not have to withdraw to the 1967 lines.<br />
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He urged Mr. Obama to commit to the assurances laid out in 2004 by then president George W. Bush, who said “new realities on the ground,” meant a “full and complete return” to the 1967 borders was “unrealistic.”<br />
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“Prime Minister Netanyahu expects to hear a reaffirmation from President Obama of US commitments made to Israel in 2004, which were overwhelmingly supported by both houses of Congress,” Mr. Netanyahu’s statement said.<br />
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Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, however, welcomed Mr. Obama’s efforts to renew talks with Israel that collapsed last year, a senior Palestinian official said.<br />
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“President Abbas expresses his appreciation of the continuous efforts exerted by President Obama with the objective of resuming the permanent status talks in the hope of reaching a final status agreement,” said the official, Saeb Erekat.<br />
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Mr. Erekat, responding to Mr. Obama’s Middle East policy address, added that Mr. Abbas would soon convene “emergency” talks with Palestinian and Arab officials to consider further steps.<br />
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The Islamist Hamas movements immediately called on President Obama to take “concrete steps,” not merely issue “slogans” in support of Palestinian independence and an end to Israeli occupation.<br />
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“What Obama needs to do is not to add slogans but to take concrete steps to protect the rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation,” Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri told Agence-France Presse.<br />
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The New York Times reported:<br />
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“His message is clear,” said Muhsen Awajy, a dissident Islamist lawyer in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. “Do the job, and when you finish — when you have paid the price — we as Americans are ready to support our interests in a new phase.” He added: “It is a great country with great values, and he should translate that into timely intervention.”<br />
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The financial support that the president offered Egypt in the speech — forgiveness of $1 billion in debt — met with appreciation, but it was tempered for some Egyptians by memories of the tens of billions of dollars in aid that the United States gave to the authoritarian government of former President Hosni Mubarak over the years. Others said that Mr. Obama’s talk of support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund was likely to remind Egyptians of the economic liberalization under the Mubarak government — led by Mr. Mubarak’s banker son, Gamal — which enabled a small elite to accrue vast wealth.<br />
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“The Egyptian experience with both these institutions is totally negative, because the so-called structural economic adjustment that had been done only made the rich richer and the poor poorer,” said Hassan Nafaa, a political scientist at Cairo University who attended Mr. Obama’s speech in Cairo two years ago. “It seems that he is helping the capitalist system, and not taking into account the social situation in Egypt.”<br />
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In contrast to the fascination with President Obama’s address to the Muslim world in Cairo two years ago, or the rapt suspense at his comments toward his former ally Hosni Mubarak during the Egyptian revolution, Egyptians, Syrians, Libyans and Saudis generally professed only a dim awareness on Thursday of what was being said in Washington. <br />
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Even in Libya, where American-backed air strikes rain down on the forces of Col. Muammar Qaddafi, most patrons of a café in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi were more concerned with a local street protest against a man from the city who was still supporting Colonel Qaddafi as an anchor on state television.<br />
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“We’ve had long experience with American policy in the region, and we don’t trust Obama’s call for change in Syria,” said Abdel Majid Manjouni, head of the opposition Socialist Democratic Arab Union Party in Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city. “Only the Syrian people can impose change, not the powers abroad.”<br />
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Still, some close observers said they detected a “new strategy” from Washington. <br />
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“We felt that for the first time that he was taking to us, and not to the leaders, as he did before,” said Mona Makram-Ebeid, a professor at American University in Cairo and a former member of the Egyptian parliament from a legally recognized liberal party. “This time he put his hands on the real problems that are affecting the different countries.”<br />
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Ms. Makram-Ebeid applauded Mr. Obama’s talk of tracking down the money stolen by ousted dictators and combating corruption.<br />
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“He is not just talking about democracy and human rights, he is talking about throwing back the shackles of the past and looking for hope for the future, and he spoke about the risks,” she said.<br />
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Some others around the region agreed that Mr. Obama’s professed support for the democratic movements in the region — “two leaders have stepped aside, more may follow” — sounded unlike the statements they heard during the first days of the uprising in Egypt. <br />
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“Everybody still has it in the back of their minds how America flip-flopped in their position toward these Arab revolutions,” said Amr Jarrad, 28, a banker in Amman, Jordan. “If you were so good in supporting autocratic regimes, why can’t you be so good in telling them to leave?”<br />
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In Riyadh, the Saudi capital, the speech fell awkwardly between two evening prayer times as the Arab weekend was beginning, so it was not easy to find people who had heard Mr. Obama speak. A few Saudi women dispatched Twitter postings underscoring that the president stressed gender equality in his remarks, and a few Saudi men said they thought the point might have been directed at them.<br />
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Saudi activists noted that Washington had already, as long ago as 2004, taken the line publicly that the Saudi monarchy had no choice to reform, but nothing tangible had come of it.<br />
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“With all these nice words, will it be transformed into policy?” said Mohammad F. al-Qahtani, a political activist. “That is a big if.”<br />
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That was the widespread reaction to the sections of the speech dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. In general, Arabs find it galling that American presidents rarely criticize Israel; while Mr. Obama did say, “the dream of a Jewish and democratic state cannot be fulfilled with permanent occupation,” some viewers found that insufficient.<br />
In Cairo, Essam el-Erian, a spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood and its newly formed Islamist political party, said the message to the Arab world was: “Do not wait to get any support from the White House, maintain your efforts and achieve your freedom.”<br />
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(Published in <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/">http://english.alarabiya.net/</a> on May 19)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-83442266737104683422011-05-10T02:52:00.000-07:002011-05-10T02:55:22.916-07:00Egyptian media blame ‘anti-revolutionaries’ for clashes between Islamists and Christians<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-eP3r1PImAkM/TckKi5gdd0I/AAAAAAAAAKc/6nVqVfgoGSY/s1600/Egypt1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" j8="true" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-eP3r1PImAkM/TckKi5gdd0I/AAAAAAAAAKc/6nVqVfgoGSY/s320/Egypt1.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><span style="color: red;">MUSTAPHA AJBAILI</span><br />
<br />
<br />
Egyptian media blamed the recent deadly violence between Islamists and Coptic Christians on “anti-revolutionaries” as the country’s grand mufti and chief interpreter of Islamic law warned the country could descend into a civil war.<br />
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“We are facing the anti-revolutionary groups who are convinced that any success of the revolution was an even greater threat to their interests and so are trying to fuel confessional conflict,” wrote Al Ahram newspaper, the most widely circulating Egyptian daily publication.<br />
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Justice Minister Abdel Aziz Al Gindi has vowed the government would strike with an “iron hand” those who threatened the country’s national security and warned that “Egypt has already become a nation in danger.” <br />
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On a day when casualty figures relating to clashes between Islamists and Coptic Christians over a controversial interfaith marriage kept rising, Prime Minister Essam Sharaf postponed a trip to the Gulf to hold an emergency meeting with his cabinet members.<br />
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Ali Gomaa, Egypt’s grand mufti and chief interpreter of Islamic law, was quoted in main independent daily Al Masri Al Yom as warning of the potential for civil war, “because of outlaws who want to defy the authority of the state,” according to Agence France-Press.<br />
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Meanwhile Interior Minister Mansur Al Issawi denied reports that weapons had been stored in Saint Mena church.<br />
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“Contrary to rumors that there were weapons inside the church, it was the owner of a cafe near the church who fired a gun,” he told the government daily Al Akhbar.<br />
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Security officials said police arrested a man they identified as the Muslim husband of the alleged convert, saying he had spread the word that his wife was being detained in a building next to the church.<br />
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Saturday’s incident, in which 12 people were killed and 232 were wounded, was the second deadly sectarian clash since the January 15 revolution, in which Muslims and Christians joined hands in Tahrir Square to demand the departure of then President Hosni Mubarak.<br />
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The clashes were triggered by a controversy over interfaith marriage concerning a 26-year-old woman, Camilia Shehata. She is the wife of a Coptic priest, Tadros Samaan, and disappeared in July 2010 after reportedly converting to Islam, possibly on account of an unhappy marriage. Divorce is forbidden by the Coptic Church, and some Christians have been known to convert to Islam in order to remarry.<br />
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Islamists, charging that she was forcibly confined in a church, protested several times. They gathered in front of the Saint Mena Church, which was where the clashes occurred.<br />
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But Ms. Shehata has appeared in a new picture published by Al Ahram newspaper with Naguib Gebrael, of the Egyptian Union of Human Rights Organization. Mr. Gebrael, a lawyer, told Al Ahram that he would represent her in a court where a complaint was filed against the church for allegedly holding her in forced confinement.<br />
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Ms. Shehata also appeared on a Christian broadcasting channel, with her husband and child.<br />
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“Let the protesters leave the church alone and turn their attention to Egypt’s future,” she said, adding that she had never converted to Islam.<br />
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In March, Muslims and Christians clashed in the town of Helwan near Cairo. Thirteen people were killed and a church was torched. The cause of the fighting was a rumored romantic relationship between a Muslim woman and a Christian man.<br />
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In swift response by the country’s military rulers, 190 people were arrested in Saturday’s violence and were sent to trial, as security was stepped up at houses of worship, amid indications that Egypt’s conservative Islamic movement, led by Salafis, was becoming increasingly restive about the country’s traditionally secular environment.<br />
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Inter-faith relationships among faiths are frowned upon in Egypt, where Christians make up about 10 percent of its 80 million people. Such relationships are sometimes the source of deadly clashes between the faiths, said The Associated Press.<br />
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If a Christian woman marries a Muslim, she is expelled from the church. A Muslim woman is not allowed to marry a Christian man, according to state law.<br />
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Because divorce is banned under the Coptic Church, unless under extenuating circumstances, many women resort to conversion as a way to get out of a marriage.<br />
Christians complain about unfair treatment, including rules they say make it easier to build a mosque than a church.<br />
In 2010, Egypt saw more than its usual share of sectarian strife, and a rights group has said such clashes have been on the rise. Muslims and Christians had been brought together during the protests that ousted Mr. Mubarak.<br />
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(Published by Mustapha Ajbaili on <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/">http://english.alarabiya.net/</a> May 9, 2011)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6337909237611182730.post-39196675186982782122011-05-09T02:33:00.000-07:002011-05-10T02:42:13.212-07:00Tunisia elections declared in doubt amid row over possible coup remarks<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-8pCgNcrH-XA/TckHaOrLetI/AAAAAAAAAKY/DI_aXgiTBWU/s1600/Tunisia.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="196" j8="true" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-8pCgNcrH-XA/TckHaOrLetI/AAAAAAAAAKY/DI_aXgiTBWU/s320/Tunisia.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
<span style="color: red;">MUSTAPHA AJBAILI</span><br />
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Tunisia’s planned July elections to form a new government after the ouster of the former president could be delayed amid renewed unrest, interim Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi said on Monday.<br />
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Protests erupted against Mr. Essebsi’s government last Thursday after former interior minister Farhat Rajhi claimed a military coup was being prepared should the Islamist Ennahda (Renaissance) win the July election.<br />
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Mr. Rajhi, in a video interview posted on Facebook, said some members of the ruling elite still in power were preparing a military coup should the Islamist Ennahda (Renaissance) win the July 24 election.<br />
“Since independence, political life has been dominated by the people of the Tunisian Sahel,” such as former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, toppled in January.<br />
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Despite Mr. Ben Ali’s ouster these people were not ready to cede power, Mr. Rajhi said.<br />
“If the results of the forthcoming elections go against their interests, there will be a military coup,” he said.<br />
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Mr. Rahji also said that Mr. Essebsi had discussed the military coup issue during a visit to Algeria in mid-March. Algeria and Tunisia , neighbors in North Africa, have had a tenuous relationship.<br />
“The nomination on April 18 of General Rachid Ammar as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff is only in preparation of the coup,” Mr. Rahji said.<br />
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Mr. Essebsi responded on Sunday saying, “Farhat Rajhi is a liar and his statements are dangerous and irresponsible and (he) deserves to be prosecuted.”<br />
In a bid to reassure protesters he reiterated commitment to the July poll but said logistical problems could delay the vote.<br />
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“The government made a commitment by choosing the date of July 24 and we intend to keep to that date but if the reform committee says there are technical and logistical hitches, there will be another probability to discuss,” he said.<br />
“It is true we have been slow in dealing with this but the high commission charged with preparing these crucial elections in July is independent and the government is only giving it material and logistical support,” Mr. Essebsi said.<br />
The election will appoint an assembly to draw up a new constitution after the January 14 ouster of Mr. Ben Ali, who held power for 23 years. His authoritarian rule, according to his critics, was characterized by corruption.<br />
The uprising that toppled Mr. Ben Ali sparked revolts across the Arab world, such as in Egypt.<br />
Mr. Essebsi said the work of the provisional government would cease on the day of the vote.<br />
(Published by Mustapha Ajbaili o nhttp://english.alarabiya.net/ May 9, 2011)Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06959304654742562639noreply@blogger.com0