Has Morocco’s gov’t hit a brick wall in reform mission?

By Mustapha Ajbaili


Since assuming office nearly five months ago, Morocco’s moderate Islamist-led government has worked arduously to punch a hole in an old system resistant to reform. It has failed almost at every attempt, disappointed many of those who saw in them a glimmer of hope, and created enemies with various social forces, including largely the unemployed graduates.

The pessimists are gaining ground and the protest movement, once thought to be dead, rebounded last Sunday with sizeable rallies in several cities.

The much publicized “participatory governance” ─ a shared decision-making process between elected officials and the royal court ─ has turned into a euphemistic expression for a post-Arab Spring form of collective totalitarianism.

Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane has walked a tightrope for almost five months, trying to satisfy the public without upsetting the king and the coterie of oligarchs running the political show from behind a curtain.

During the election campaign, Benkirane’s Justice and Development Party (JPD) promised to mend the state budget by fighting corruption, inequality, and privileges.
Benkirane must have known well that he was up against a system set up in a way to ensure that no political party wins an outright majority and is thus unable to form a government by itself.

Benkirane found himself in a coalition with one of Morocco’s most corrupt and powerful political parties, the Istiqlal (Independence) party and the populist Islamist leader will see his coalition breaking apart the moment he begins to touch sensitive nerves of corruption.

We saw that recently when PJD Minister of Information Mustapha el-Khalfi came up with a proposal to reform the media sector. The proposed bill contained new audiovisual media guidelines devised to ensure the transparency, independence and competitiveness in the sector. Media hawks orbiting the establishment, best known locally as the Makhzen, hit back at the minister’s proposed plan and rejected it entirely.

Why?
Mediated explanations focused on the fact that the new guidelines sought to “Islamize” the Moroccan media and that the hawks were defending the values of modernity, openness and liberty.

However, such values are the least of their concerns. They are more concerned about money and about losing their privileges, because the new guidelines call for the transparency of audiovisual production contracts and that they be awarded on merit, not favoritism.

What happened next?

The hawks appeared to have won the skirmish. The minister was summoned to the palace and all we heard later was that his proposed bill was ordered to be shelved.

This is just a small example of the government’s failure to reform the system and while it is still early to make a definitive judgment about its performance, its tendency to surrender each time it provokes a fight is frustrating to the people.

Implicit alliance of Egypt’s Islamists and military rulers shows cracks

By: Mustapha Ajbaili


An alliance that was formed following the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak between Egypt’s powerful Muslim Brotherhood group and the intractable ruling generals has exhibited cracks in the recent weeks as the country moves closer to the presidential race.


Both parties built up their strengths in the shade during Mubarak’s 30-year rule. The military took advantage of billions of dollars in U.S. military aid to strengthen itself far from the public limelight, while the Muslim brotherhood built up a massive underground network that brought it closer to the lives of millions of Egyptians.


In the wake of the Jan. 25 revolution, both forces made their presence felt in the country’s political center stage. Both appeared to understand one another’s might, agenda, and the need for mutual cooperation, which developed into an alliance – however implicit this might be. The coming together of the two forces in the post-revolutionary Egypt spared the country a clash of the titans.


Coming under fire from liberal groups last year, the military moved closer to the Brotherhood and succumbed to its “less painful” demands in several occasions to win their support. For the generals, winning the support of Egypt’s most powerful political bloc was essential for steering the boat in the direction of their intended objective, which looks more like a democracy, but not a democracy. They want a system in which elected officials manage domestic affairs but have little say on strategic matters.


While everyone was busy talking about a “Turkish model” that reconciles Islam with democracy, the generals in Cairo appeared to be heading towards a “Turkish model” in which a "pasha" general – like the leader of Turkey’s 1980 military coup, Kenan Evren – acts as the custodian of the state’s strategic issues, especially when it comes to foreign policy, including primarily the relation with the United States and Israel.


Muslim Brotherhood leaderships, appearing to have learned from decades of enmity with Egyptian rulers, decided this time it was in their best interest to support the military in the path to democracy, because they are all but certain to emerge as the victors.


The two forces had interests in joint collaboration during the transitional period, but their starkly different – if not opposing – visions of the future dictated their inevitable breakup – and the cracks are emerging.


The Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), has expressed cynicism over the military council’s staunch support for the cabinet of Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri.


“Is it a desire to abort the revolution and destroy the people’s belief in their ability to achieve their goals? Or is there an intention to defraud or influence the forthcoming presidential election?” the Brotherhood’s party asked in a statement.


“If anyone intends to reproduce the former corrupt regime with new faces, the people are ready to move in order to revive their revolution,” the Islamist party threatened.


The military and the Brotherhood have worked together – or rather played together – in an often climate of distrust, which never burst into the open until last week.


Egypt’s military ruler Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi said he could not take it anymore. “We were careful not to be provoked, but what happened recently is enough.” Sounding the warning bell, he called “on all to be aware of history’s lessons not to repeat past mistakes.”


At this stage in Egypt’s transition, the Muslim Brotherhood likely realized that it and the military have two different understandings of democracy.


Unlike the generals, Islamists want a democracy in which elected officials and public institutions would have full power over the military and the country’s foreign policy. The ruling generals, under pressure from Washington, will never accept this…at least without a fight. It is Israel’s security here which is at stake!



(Published in English.alarabiya.net on March 2, 2012)

مغرب "الأوراش الكبرى"... إلى أين؟

مصطفى اجبيلى

 

ميناء طنجة المتوسط، تي جي في طنجة - الدار البيضاء، موروكو مول... إلخ، كلها مشاريع كبيرة من شأن أي بلد أن يفتخر بمثلها. لكن إلى أي حد يمكن لمثل هذه المشاريع أن تسهم حقاً في التنمية الاقتصادية للبلد؟ وما مدى نجاعتها في تقليص البطالة ومحاربة الفقر وتعزيز التنمية البشرية في بلد يتذيل بلدان شمال إفريقيا والشرق الأوسط في نسب التعليم؟ 

من بين عشرات المقالات اليومية في الجرائد المغربية نجد النقد والنقد المضاد في الشأن السياسي والاجتماعي وغيره, دونما التطرق بشكل كافٍ للسياسات الاقتصادية التي ينتهجها البلد. 

وقد أثار موضوع "الأوراش الكبرى" بالتحديد اهتمامي كونها تكلف دافعي الضرائب في المغرب أموالاً طائلة، وتجعل البلد برمته عبداً دائماً للدول والمؤسسات المالية العالمية المانحة للقروض دون أن تقدم هذه المشاريع "العملاقة" مردوداً إيجابياً ملحوظاً للشعب، خصوصاً الفئات الفقيرة منه. ربما تساعد هذه المشاريع في خلق بضعة آلاف من فرص العمل وتشجيع بعض الاستثمارات الأجنبية هنا وهناك, لكن الثمن باهظ جداً على المغرب. فمعظم تلك المشاريع عبارة عن صفقات سياسية أكثر منها اقتصادية. 

فمشروع القطار السريع يوهمني بأن المغاربة كلهم في عجلة من أمرهم كي يقطعوا المسافة من طنجة إلى الدار البيضاء في ساعتين عوضاً عن أربع. هذا المشروع - بحسب مراقبين - هو صفقة لإرضاء فرنسا الغاضبة من شراء المغرب طائرات إف 16 الأميركية بدلاً من "رافال" الفرنسية.. ببساطة هكذا تبدو الأمور. فرنسا أقرضت المغرب ملياري يورو كجزء أكبر من ميزانية إنشاء المشروع. ومعظم هذا المبلغ سيعود إلى فرنسا من خلال الشركة الفرنسية المكلفة بإنشاء المشروع والمهندسين الفرنسيين الذين سيعملون في المشرع.  

هكذا تعمل الدول والمؤسسات الكبرى، تقرض الأموال للدول الفقيرة من خلال اتفاقيات رسمية وتستعيدها في البداية  بشكل غير مباشر من خلال شركاتها التي تعمل في إنشاء هذه المشاريع، وبعدها بشكل مباشر حيث تقوم الدول الفقيرة بسداد الديون والفوائد المفروضة عليها، وحين تشتد الأزمات الاجتماعية على هذه الدول الفقيرة وتتخلف عن سداد ديونها في الوقت المطلوب تعاد جدولة هذه الديون بشروط عادة ما تكون سياسية كشراء الذمم في الأمم المتحدة والتبعية المطلقة، أو اقتصادية كفرض مزيد من الفوائد على القروض وفتح المزيد من القطاعات أمام الشركات الغربية، وفى بعض الأحيان تفرض عليك أن تقبل أن تكون مزبلة لنفاياتها النووية أو مستنقعاً لصناعاتها الملوثة للبيئة.. وكل هذا طبعاً باسم التنمية الاقتصادية العمياء. 

هذا ما يحدث في المغرب للأسف الشديد، نقترض فنتورّط ثم تُفرض علينا شروط من قبيل أن نفتح مولاً كبيراً لتسويق الماركات العالمية وامتصاص المزيد من دماء المغاربة، أو منح هكتارات شاسعة من الأراضي لهذا الغربي أو ذاك الخليجي.

أتساءل ما إذا كان بإمكان فرنسا أن تقرضنا ملياري يورو لكي نطور بها صناعاتنا الوطنية ونبني بها مؤسسات لتكوين طاقات بشرية في أعلى المستويات العالمية. غالب الظن أن فرنسا سترفض؛ لأنها لو فعلت ستكون بذلك تساعد المغرب على أن يكون مستقلاً ذاتياً ومنافساً لها ولشركاته ولطاقاتها البشرية.

لقد آن الأوان لمن يرعى سياسات التنمية الاقتصادية في المغرب أن يدرك أن المغرب ليس دبي ولا أمريكا لكي يبني مولات وقطارات سريعة تورطنا أكثر مما تفيدنا. فلو كانت فيها فائدة لوجدنا تركيا كلها مولات وقطارات سريعة، فمثل هذه المشاريع عادة ما تكون عبارة عن مظاهر وليس دوافع للازدهار الاقتصادي، وهذا ما يجب أن يدركه المغرب، حسب رأيي المتواضع.